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Trust-building on the Internet: evidence from eBay 
 
Jie Zhang 
College of Business Administration 




Online auction web sites provide a convenient yet risky trading venue for the participants. 
The uncertainty about the product quality and the credibility of the traders, however, may 
impede the liquidity and efficiency of the trades in online auctions. This research seeks to 
establish a framework to better assess the effect of a seller’s feedback “reputation” on the 
closing price of an online auction. In contrast to the literature on reputation in Internet 
auction, we claim and prove that buyers assess a seller’s reputation from her feedbacks 
related to her selling activities only but not those from both sales and purchases. We build a 
model to illustrate how this reputation system works and test the hypotheses with data 
collected from the eBay web site on auctions of Apple iPod MP3 players. It is found that (1) 
the numbers of a seller’s positive and negative comments from her buyers solely are 
significantly correlated with the bidding price of her sales transactions; (2) the numbers of a 
seller’s positive or negative comments earned in her purchasing transactions are not 
significant in explaining the bidding price of her sales transactions; (3) negative comments 
are weighted more heavily than positive ones. 
 




Electronic business has grown dramatically over the past decade, represented by more 
than 25 percent growth rate in annual sales (US Census Bureau). Consumer-to-consumer 
online auction web sites, for example, eBay.com, Yahoo! Auction, and Amazon auction etc., 
have become one of the most successful business models of electronic commerce. With 9.4 
million registered users, 971 million items listed, and $24 billion worth of items sold in 2003, 
eBay has become the fastest growing and the most popular online auction market among the 
all. It realized $2.17 billion net revenue in 2003, a 78 percent increase over the year before. In 
addition, eBay has expanded its operation scope into 28 foreign countries other than the US. 




 The success of the auction web sites comes from several advantages: (1) The Internet 
provides convenient and efficient marketplace for the consumers to trade among each other. 
In contrast with the auction in a physical auction site, online auction provides anonymity, 
accuracy, and interactiveness to the customers so that the transactions become more 
transparent and up-to-date. (2) More importantly, online auction has very low entry cost for 
the sellers. Any ordinary individual can easily bring her goods to millions of potentially 
interested buyers worldwide without setting up any storefronts or bearing with the high cost 
incurred in transactions. Online auction web sites offer a virtual “flea market” where 
everyone can become a seller as easily as being a buyer. 
However, the ideal “frictionless” marketplace cannot exist without building trust 
among online traders. Traders exist in the name of their user IDs, which could be created and 
changed easily. A trader could possibly have as many identities on the Internet as have 
“eyebrows” in the real life. The anonymity and virtuality of the traders’ online identity 
challenges trust building on the Internet community, especially in the consumer-to-consumer 
online auction web sites. It is difficult for the traders to tell the difference between reputable 
online sellers and criminals who use the Internet to rob people. Online auctions remain the 
number one aching for Internet fraud. According to the Internet Fraud Watch operated by the 
National Consumers League, online auction frauds accounted for 90 percent of the total 
frauds reported to the Internet Fraud Watch in 2002 and the average loss per person rose from 
$310 in 1999 to around $468 in 2002, indicating the deterioration in online trading safety.  
To mitigate the negative effect of frauds happened in online auction, many auction 
web sites have set up some feedback forums with comments about the sellers based on other 
people’s experiences (Figure 1). The basic idea is to use the inputs from the traders about 
their own experiences of trading with that user ID to signal all the other traders about that 
traders’ credibility and affect their behavior accordingly. Those feedback mechanisms are 
expected to reflect the true reputation of the traders and to help identifying the fraudulent 
ones. Moreover, the downside effect of getting negative ratings is also expected to threaten 
the participants to behave well in the transactions involved on those web sites.  
A serial of research took the data from eBay transactions and examined the effect of 
online feedback profiles on bidding outcomes: Ba and Pavlou 2002, Bajari and Hortacsu 
2003, Houser and Wooders 2000, Melnik and Alm 2002, McDonald and Slawson 2002, to 
name a few. As shown in Section 2 of the paper, fruitful results have been achieved in the 
literature.  
But in our view, one of the most important feature of online auction markets, or more 
generally, most e-commerce markets, is these new markets greatly reduce transaction cost, 
particularly, there is very low entry cost for sellers. This means sellers are no longer sellers in 
the traditional sense, usually a firm, or a retailer store, which sells large quantity of product to 
the market with almost no purchase from the market. Now any user can sell there goods in 
the market with a very low fee. A user can be a buyer for some time, and a seller for other 
times. Actually, this is the defining feature, and the basic idea behind eBay - the billion-dollar 
business - a “flea market”. Unfortunately, the important implication of this feature has almost 
been completely ignored in the literature. All the paper mentioned above assume sellers only 
sell in the markets, while buyers only purchase from the markets.  
Our paper is the first attempt to investigate the importance of such a feature. 
Specifically, we show that since any user can always change her role at any time in these 
online auction markets, which they do, any user’s reputation actually has two components: 
her “selling reputation”, coming from her previous selling records and her “buying 
reputation”, coming from her previous buying records. And given the current mechanism 
design of these markets, the costs and benefits to build the two reputations are different for 
users. This gives incentive for users to strategically manipulate their reputations. But rational 
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buyers should be able to understand this and would separate a seller’s selling reputation from 
buying reputation when trying to infer the true probability of receiving the product. As a 
result, the two types of reputation have very different effects on winning prices.  In our model, 
with the assumption that sellers only ship the product when payments are received, we show 
that sellers’ good selling reputation increase winning prices, bad selling reputation reduce 
winning prices, while sellers’ buying reputation has no significant effect on winning prices.  
Using actual auction data collected from eBay, we show empirically that first, sellers 
do make purchases as well as sales, in our sample, for an average seller, 38 percent of all the 
transactions are actually purchases, and for some sellers, it can be as high as 99 percent. 39 
percent of the sellers have buying transaction more that 50 percent; second, the effects of the 
two types of reputation confirm our theoretical prediction. Sellers’ good selling feedback 
increases sell prices, bad selling feedback reduces sell prices, and sellers’ buying feedback 
have the wrong signs and are not statistically significant. We do find some other variables, 
such as product condition and accepted payment methods, also affect the sell prices.  
Hence our paper contributes to the literature by clarifying the meaning of reputation 
in online auction markets theoretically and empirically. This may change some of the 
previous results obtained in the literature, for example, some papers find no significant effect 
of positive and/or negative reputations, and this is possibly due to the inclusion of sellers’ 
“buying feedback”  dampen the effect of reputation. More importantly, our results call for 
more attention to the strategic aspects of reputation and rethinking of the long-short run 
player reputation framework frequently used in the literature.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
theoretical conclusions on reputation and empirical results on the effect online feedback 
profiles. A model pointing out our idea is brought out in Section 3. Then Section 4 shows the 
empirical evidence and tests hypotheses. Section 5 summaries the whole work and discusses 
the limitation and opportunities for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The reputation formation and has been extensively studied in economics using game 
theory. The reputation literature, for example, Kreps and Wilson 1982, Milgrom and Roberts 
1982, Fudenberg and Levine 1992, Klein and Leffler 1981, Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson 
2002, suggests that the feedback mechanisms used in the online auction web sites can enforce 
the traders to take the cooperation strategy and act honestly.1  
A review of principal empirical research results on online feedback forums is shown 
in Table 1.2 They mainly studied the impact of feedback ratings on the prices and probability 
of sales. A trader can observe any other trader’s feedback comments left by her trading 
partners in the previous transactions. Actions of either a buyer or a seller, such as willingness 
to bid, bidding prices setting, determination to complete the transactions, will be influenced 
by the ratings of her trading partners.  
 
Table 1 Summary of Principal Research Literature 
Citation Items sold Remarks 
Ba and Pavlou, 2002 Music, software, 
Electronics 
Positive feedback increased estimated price, but negative 
feedback did not have an effect 
Bajari and Hortacsu, 
2003 
Coins Both positive and negative feedback affect probability of 
modeled buyer entry into the auction, but only positive 
                                                 
1 For a detailed review, see Dellarocas 2003. 
2 Adapted from Resnick Zeckhauser, Swanson and Lockwood, 2002. 
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feedback had a significant effect on final price 
Dewan and Hsu, 
2001 
Stamps Higher net score increases price 
Eaton, 2002 Electric guitars Negative feedback reduces probability of sale, but not 
price of sold items 
Houser and 
Wooders, 2000 










Coins No significant effects, but negative feedback seems to 
increase price (!) in univariate analysis 





Negative feedback reduces price, but only for used items
Livingston Golf clubs Positive feedback increases both likelihood of sale and 
price; effect tapers off once a record is established 
Lucking-Reiley et 
al., 2000 
Coins No effect from positive feedback; negative feedback 
reduces price 
Melnik and Alm, 
2002 









Both forms of feedback affect probability of sale but not 






Controlled field experiment; established seller 
commands higher prices than newcomers; among 
newcomers, small amounts of negative feedback have 
little effect 
 
However, they made assumption based on the traditional reputation theory that a 
customer is either good or bad and that characteristics never change over time. Their findings 
of the relationship between the seller’s reputation and the bidding price are ambiguous. When 
I assume strategic customers, they may behave differently from what the literature presented. 
For example, they can manipulate the values of their ratings by acting differently as a buyer 
from as a seller, or across different transaction amounts. In this case, the ratings do not 
correlated directly with the total value of ratings, but the buyers would care about the positive 
ratings of the customers as a seller exclusively, and vice versa. I expect that the empirical test 
under this assumption can lead to better results and can explain the mixed results obtained in 
the previous studies. None of the literature has separated the comments of a seller earned 
from her sellers from those from her buyers. 
If the above hypotheses are proved, more suggestions can be provided to the online 
auction companies to improve their feedback mechanism, such as separating the ratings as a 
buyer or as a seller, give a weight to the scores of the ratings, etc.3  
The phenomenon that some sellers do not solely sell, but also buy on eBay has been 
noticed in the literature, for example, Cabral and Hortacsu [2003] found in their dataset, that 
38 percent of the sellers in the Beanie baby and silver proof set, 33 percent in gold coins, and 
20 percent in ThinkPad categories followed the “buy first, sell later” strategy. So they 
conclude that “buy first and sell later” is a widespread phenomenon on eBay and they 
interpret this as evidence that some sellers start off by investing (as a buyer) on an initial 
                                                 
3 While we were working on this paper in January 2004, eBay changed its display of member feedback profiles 
by separating their feedback from buyers from those from sellers, exactly as we have suggested. 
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reputation history, assuming that buyers would take the initial record of sellers as a genuine 
selling record although it contains selling as well as buying. Unsurprisingly, their empirical 
test didn’t support their theoretical prediction that sellers with bad reputation should engage 
in this activity.  
Essentially, we are asking what the effect of a seller’s buying record on her reputation 
as a seller, or on the auction price are. So we are not limiting our attention to this particular 
“buy first, sell later” phenomenon. If a seller’s buying records are generally good, and if the 
good purchasing records did improve the seller’s “reputation” as a buyer, and increase her 
selling prices, there is nothing preventing the seller from buying the good reputation at any 
time after her initial period on eBay, though she may be more eager to do so at the beginning. 
But if buyers are capable of distinguishing a seller’s selling behavior from her buying records, 
these buying transactions would not affect the seller’s “selling reputation”, hence would not 
affect the auction price. The “buy first and sell later” strategy might just be the result of a 
natural fact that people begin to deal with eBay and learn the rules from their purchasing 
transactions, and only start to sell when they get more experienced and interested later on. 
Any other purchase after the initial period could also arise from true demand of the products, 
instead of strategic manipulation of reputation.  
 
3. The Model 
 
A fully developed model would be very complicate because now there are no short 
lived buyers. All users are long run player and have to solve dynamic maximization problem 
in order to make decision of selling, buying, or how much to bid. Specifically, since bidders 
have to contempt the effect of her bid behavior on her reputation, and hence long run profit, 
we lose the ability to use the elegant long-run/short-run player reputation framework 
developed since Klein and Leffler [1981], Sharpiro [1983], and applied to ecommerce setting 
by Dellacoce [2002]. Sine we only want to demonstrate that the reputation of the player when 
they are playing different roles have different meaning for other players, we assume for now 
that the bidding decision is static, and leave strategic buying/bidding of sellers for further 
research. We will show this condition is satisfied in the equilibrium.  
We develop a simple model based on Houser and Wooders [2000] to illustrate our 
point. Assume all players live infinite periods. A player, or a user, can sell a unit of 
indivisible product, or purchase a unit in any period. We assume whether to buy, or sell in 
current period is determined exogenously.  
There are two types of players, H (honest) and D (dishonest), and the fraction of 
honest player is [0,1]θ ∈ , which is common knowledge to all players. But the exact type of a 
player is private information of that player.  
If a user sells a unit of the product in current period, she becomes a seller. She lists the 
product on eBay, provides description of the product, shipping, payment and other 
information, and perhaps picture of the product.  
Other users who want to buy the product then submit bid for the product.  Buyer i’s 
value of the good is iv , which is randomly drawn from a continuous distribution [ , ]V v v . The 
auction is a sealed second price bid. The highest bidder wins the auction, and pays the price 
of the second highest bid. After the auction, buyer then can choose to default, or to make 
payment to the seller.  
We assume seller always wait till receive the payment before taking any action. So 
seller would never ship the product before she actually received payment. This make sure 
there is no gain from winning a bid but not making payment, so buyers always make payment 
after win an auction, no matter what type the buyer is.  
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After receiving payment, a seller can choose to cooperate (co, deliver the goods) or 
cheat (ch, not deliver the good). An honest player always deliver the good when she is a 
seller and receive payment from a winning bidder, while a dishonest player does not deliver 
the goods after receiving payment so she can make immediate profit.  
After received the product, or not received the product for long enough time, the 
buyer report the result to the system and everybody can view the feedback. In addition to any 
comment, the buyer explicitly gives +1(positive) to a satisfied transaction, -1 to unsatisfied 
transaction, and 0 (neutral) otherwise. We assume the feedback is noisy. So there is a 
probability α that the buyer will report a negative feedback even the seller cooperate, and a 
probability β  that the buyer report a positive feedback even the seller cheat.  
We assume there is no withdraw of feedback after it is reported.  
Given buyer i’s value of the good is iv , the bid function is 
( , , , , ) ( , , , )i s s b b s s b b ib v P N P N p P N P N v=  ,     (1) 
in which ( , , , )s s b bp P N P N  is the probability that the seller, with history ( , , , )s s b bP N P N , would 
deliver the goods. , , ,s s b bP N P N  are the number of positive, negative feedbacks of the user as 
seller and buyer, respectively.  
Assume the prior consumer belief of θ  is 1p , we have following proposition: 
Propositon1. If a buyer distinguishes the seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying 
reputation”, the posterior expected consumer beliefs of p is given by: 
1
1 1
(1 )( | , , , )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
s s
s s s s
P N
s s b b P N P N
pp P N P N
p p
α α
α α β β
−
=
− + − −
;   (2) 
If a buyer takes all feedbacks as the sellers “selling records”, as commonly used in the 
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.    (3) 
Proposition 2: If a buyer distinguishes the seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying 
reputation”, bid price will increase with sP , and decrease with sN , but will be unrelated with 
the buying reputation bP  and bN . If a buyer takes all feedbacks as the sellers “selling records”, 
bid price will increase with sP  and bP , and decrease with sN  and bN . 
If a buyer does not distinguish the seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying 
reputation”, there would be extra incentive for the buyer who wants to improve reputation to 
bid price higher than the expected value. If such a buyer wins the auction, the price would 
also reflect her “reputation motives”, that is, it is correlated with buyer’s reputation. For 
example, we would expect a buyer with lower reputation would bid higher price. But if 
buyers can distinguish seller’s “selling reputation” and “buying reputation”, there is no 
“reputation motives”, and buyers’ biding function would again be static.  
 
4. Evidence from eBay 
 
The last step is to use the transaction data to test the hypotheses from the model and 
from other observations. Observations from the on-line auction website eBay.com were 
collected in February 2004. 
 
4.1 Data Collection Procedure 
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 We wrote an intelligent web agent (spider) program to collect transaction data and 
feedback data from eBay’s website. First we searched eBay (using search tool they provided 
on their web site) for auctions containing the keywords “iPod” and check the “completed 
auction only” checkbox. This took us to a page listing auctions completed within the past two 
weeks containing the keyword. The spider program will then follow the link to each of the 
auction pages on the search page and automatically download the relevant transaction data, 
for example, include trading item, the user ID of the seller and the winning buyer, starting 
and end date/time of the auction, starting bid prices, end prices, number of bidders 
participated, description of the auction items etc. The program then goes to the seller’s 
feedback page to download the whole history of the feedbacks the seller has received from 
her previous transactions. The seller’s reputation is measured by such indices as unique 
number of positive/negative feedback, unique positive/negative feedback ratio. We separate 
the indices into three groups---from unique sellers, from unique buyers and from both---
according to the types of the transaction for that user. The reputation scores are derived from 
the feedback history up to the end time of the auction, that is, by the exact time the auction is 
closed. In total we obtained transaction and reputation data for auctions on eBay for three 
models of iPod by Apple, with closing dates between February 14 and February 28.  
We further removed the transactions belonging to either of the following cases and are 
left with 135 valid auction transactions.  
• The item for sale is not iPod per se, but parts or accessories for iPods; 
• There was no bid in the entire auction period; 
• The auction ended with buy-it-now; 
• The auction was relisted because reserved price was not met; 
• The item is no longer for available for sale; 
• The auction was terminated due to errors in the listing. 
 
4.2 Variables used in Empirical Analysis 
 The dependent variable, denoted by WinningPrice, is the second highest bid plus an 
increment.  
Since a seller can earn her previous feedback from either a selling behavior or a 
buying behavior, we denote the seller reputation variables by AllPos, AllNeg, AllNeu, 
AllPosRatio, SellPos, SellNeg, SellNeu, SellPosRatio, BuyPos, BuyNeg, BuyNeu, and 
BuyPosRatio. Each buyer or seller may get multiple comments from a unique customer. In 
order to eliminate the bias from the comments from a set of particular customers and to 
reduce the effect of reputation manipulation, we counter only the first comment left by a 
customer to evaluate the above reputation variables. This is common in the literature, and it is 
also how eBay calculate and report users’ reputation. Variables AllPos, AllNeg, AllNeu and 
AllPosRatio are, respectively, the number of positive, negative and neutral comments from 
unique registered users and the ratio of positive comments among all comments from unique 
registered users. SellPos, SellNeg, SellNeu and SellPosRatio are, respectively, the number of 
positive, negative and neutral comments from her unique buyers and the ratio of positive 
comments among all comments from unique buyers. BuyPos, BuyNeg, BuyNeu, and 
BuyPosRatio are respectively, the number of positive, negative and neutral comments from 
her unique sellers and the ratio of positive comments among all comments from unique 
sellers.  
 We select the 3rd generation, 15G iPod MP3 players made by Apple Inc. The standard 
item comes with accompanying accessories like Apple earphones,  
AC adapter, firewire cable, PC firewire adapter. The retail price for a brand new product is 
$299.00. The auction items in our sample are homogeneous except accessories and degree of 
usage. Extra accessories will increase the value of the item package and a brand new iPod 
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will be valued higher than a used one. So we control the accessories and the new or used 
property of the auction items with two variables Accessories and NIB. The variable 
Accessories refers to the value of the extra accessories included with the item sold. The value 
of the accessories was obtained from the Apple online store as the market price. NIB is a 
dummy variable. NIB takes the value one if the item is listed as new-in-box and zero 
otherwise.  
 The remaining variables defining the auction’s characteristics are: NumofBids, Length, 
FirstBid, Paypal, Gallery, HighLight, Bold, and Reserve. NumofBids refers to the total 
number of bids showed up in the bid history of an auction. Since we removed those 
withdrawn or no-bid transactions, there are at least one bid for each transaction: NumofBids is 
greater than or equal to one. Length is the number of days an action listing lasts. FirstBid is 
the starting bid amount the seller chooses. Paypal, Gallery, HighLight, Bold, and Reserve are 
dummy variables. Paypal takes one if the seller accepts payment though Paypal or credit 
cards, which provides certain degree of payment protection to the buyers.  Gallery, HighLight, 
and Bold, respectively, referring to whether the seller put a thumbnail photo, highlighted the 
listing with an eye-catching colored band, or boldfaced the listing in search and listing pages. 
These variables control the sellers’ effort to grab the buyers’ eyeball and provide more 
information about the product to reduce the risks from product quality. We use dummy 
variable Reserve to indicate whether the seller put a reserve price or not. 
 
4.3 Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 provides descriptive summary of the statistics for the variables used in 
our analysis.  
The winning price ranged from a high of $345.00 to a low of $223.50. The mean 
trading price of $283.13 is lower than the market price of $299.00 posted on Apple online 
store. The eBay traders receive about 50 times of the number of comments as a seller than as 
a buyer.  
The unknown type feedbacks are the feedbacks that are not classified as from buyer, 
or seller. It counts for 6.7 percent of all the feedbacks of the sellers in our dataset. Since all 
feedbacks from June 21st 2001, are classified as from seller, or from buyer. So all unknown 
type feedback in our dataset are feedbacks left before June 21st 2001. For those sellers who 
have unknown type comments, we read through the comments and classified the sources 
manually. 
The data is supportive of our main hypothesis, that is, 
1. The sellers are not pure sellers; they are also buyer in some time. In our dataset, 14% of 
the time these sellers are buying from eBay.  
2. Comparing with their buying transactions, the sellers got distortional higher negative 
feedback ratio in their selling transactions, 1.20 percent vs. 0.69 percent, i.e., the negative 
ratio of the users as seller is 74 percent higher than the negative ratio as buyer.  
3. If we look at the seller’s negative feedback ratio when they are indeed seller, instead of 





We derive our results from the multivariate regression model.  
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where Xi represents all the product characteristics and auction characteristics: 
ln(Accessories+1), NIB, NumofBids, Length, FirstBid, Paypal, Gallery, Highlight, Bold, and 
Reserve.  
Table 3 reports the results of our empirical analysis. We find that both the positive 
and the negative comments the seller received during her previous sales have significant 
effect on the bidding price. A 10 percent increase in the positive selling record will increase 
the bidding price by 0.29 percent or around $0.82, while a 10 percent increase in the negative 
selling record will decrease the winning price by 0.5 percent or around $1.41. Suppose an 
iPod seller has one positive comment and one negative comment from previous buyers. No 
matter how many positive comments she has received from previous sellers, one more 
positive selling comment will increase her expected winning price by about $8.19 and one 
more negative selling comment will reduce her expected winning price by about $14.11. The 
results also show that negative ratings are paid more attention and therefore have higher 
impact to the winning price than positive ones do.  
The comments earned from the sellers’ previous purchases do not affect the winning 
price significantly. And the signs of the impact are opposite to our expectation, that is, an 
increase in the positive buying record will decrease the winning price and vice versa, which 
does not make sense.  
The above results further empirically support our hypothesis that buying reputation 
does not affect the seller’s goodwill in a selling transaction. A rational buyer will only 
consider the seller’s selling record when bidding for the item. 
The winning price increases significantly with the value of accessories and whether 
the product is new or not, and auction properties such as accepting paypal, number of bids, 
and the value of first bid.  
We also find that the alternative functional forms, for example, replace the 
ln(WinningPrice) with WinningPrice, does not affect the estimation results and significance 




Trust building in the online community is a crucial issue that relates to the 
survivability of the Internet market. We build a simple model to illustrate our propositions 
about the online feedback mechanism adopted by some major consumer-to-consumer online 
auction websites. That is, given the flexibility in identity creation and switching in the 
Internet environment, a bidder will separate a seller’s selling reputation from her buying 
reputation.  
We take the theory to the trading data on eBay.com---a major online auction web site 
and get the following major results:  
(1) The numbers of a seller’s positive and negative comments from her buyers solely 
are significantly correlated with the bidding price of her sales transactions;  
(2) The numbers of a seller’s positive or negative comments earned in her purchasing 
transactions are not significant in explaining the bidding price of her sales transactions;  
(3) Negative comments are weighted more heavily than positive ones.  
EBay has added the indication of the types of transactions in the feedback history 
pages since June 2001. Moreover, starting from January 2004, tabs that grouped the 
feedbacks from sellers and from buyers were included in the feedback history pages. These 
practices show that eBay has realized the importance of separating the selling feedbacks from 
the buying feedbacks. Since negative feedbacks are paid more attention and have greater 
impact on the bidding prices of the items, based on our and other research conclusion, eBay 
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should give the exact feedback score, typically, number of negative feedbacks, from the 
selling feedback history.  
We are testing our hypothesis with transactions of other categories of items on 
eBay.com. It would be interesting if we could study with the data from the online trading web 
sites from other countries, for example, EachNet.com in China.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (N = 135) 
 





$283.13 20.37 $223.50 $345.00
SellPos 1200 1130 0 7483
SellNeg 36 40 0 198
SellNeu 51.6 55.4 0 189
BuyPos 24.9 28.4 0 152
BuyNeg 0.51 0.58 0 4
Reputation 
Variables 
BuyNeu 0 0 0 0
Accessories 4.56 20.99 0 200Item 
Characteristics NIB 0.66 0.48 0 1
NumofBids 22 9.2 1 50
Length 3.4 1.9 1 10
FirstBid $30.53 71.63 $0.01 $289.99
Paypal 0.88 0.33 0 1
Gallery 0.66 0.47 0 1
Highlight 0.01 0.09 0 1
Bold 0.24 0.43 0 1
Auction 
Characteristics 
Reserve 0.10 0.30 0 1
 
 
  
14
79
Ta
bl
e 
3 
Es
tim
at
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
 (t
-s
ta
tis
tic
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s)
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
= 
ln
(W
in
ni
ng
Pr
ic
e)
 
 N
ot
e:
 *
**
 --
- p
 v
al
ue
 <
 0
.0
1,
 *
* 
--
- p
 v
al
ue
 <
 0
.0
5,
 *
 --
- p
 v
al
ue
 <
 0
.1
0.
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t V
ar
ia
bl
e 
I 
II
 
II
I 
IV
 
V
 
V
I 
V
II
 
V
II
I 
IX
 
X
 
X
I 
ln
(S
el
lP
os
+1
) 
0.
00
7*
 
0.
01
8*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
7*
**
 
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
9*
*
0.
02
8*
*
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
4*
**
 
 
(1
.7
3)
 
(3
.0
5)
(4
.5
9)
(4
.3
3)
(3
.9
7)
(3
.9
2)
 
(4
.0
5)
(4
.1
4)
(3
.8
0)
(3
.2
5)
(3
.1
4)
 
ln
(S
el
lN
eg
+1
) 
-0
.0
20
**
* 
-0
.0
47
**
*
-0
.0
52
**
*
-0
.0
54
**
*
-0
.0
52
**
*
-0
.0
49
**
* 
-0
.0
49
**
*
-0
.0
50
**
*
-0
.0
49
**
*
-0
.0
47
**
*
-0
.0
42
**
* 
 
(-
3.
52
) 
(-
3.
94
)
(-
3.
26
)
(-
4.
49
)
(-
4.
33
)
(-
4.
07
) 
(-
4.
12
)
(-
4.
20
)
(-
3.
75
)  
 
(-
3.
56
)
(-
3.
25
)  
ln
(B
uy
Po
s+
1)
 
 
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
12
*
-0
.0
13
*
-0
.0
52
-0
.0
05
 
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
03
 
 
 
(-
1.
96
)
(-
1.
66
)
(-
1.
73
)
(-
0.
88
)
(-
0.
59
) 
(-
0.
79
)
(-
0.
68
)
(-
0.
54
)
(-
0.
39
)
(-
0.
31
) 
ln
(B
uy
N
eg
+1
) 
 
0.
09
3*
*
0.
07
2*
0.
07
5*
0.
05
6
0.
04
4 
0.
04
9
0.
06
5
0.
06
4
0.
05
9
0.
04
6 
 
 
(2
.4
3)
(1
.7
7)
(1
.8
3)
(1
.3
3)
(1
.0
4)
 
(1
.1
6)
(1
.4
9)
(1
.4
3)
(1
.2
9)
(1
.0
5)
 
ln
(A
cc
es
so
rie
s+
1)
 
 
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
02
6*
**
 
0.
02
7*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
03
0*
**
 
 
 
(3
.9
0)
(3
.8
3)
(4
.2
9)
(4
.1
5)
 
(4
.3
0)
(4
.3
5)
(3
.9
5)
(4
.1
2)
(4
.3
9)
 
Fi
rs
tB
id
 
 
0.
00
01
0.
00
01
0.
00
02
 
0.
00
02
0.
00
01
0.
00
01
0.
00
01
0.
00
03
**
 
 
 
(0
.5
7)
(1
.3
4)
(1
.5
0)
 
(1
.5
5)
(1
.1
8)
(1
.0
7)
(1
.1
7)
(2
.2
1)
 
N
IB
  
 
0.
04
3*
0.
04
4*
* 
0.
05
0*
*
0.
04
1*
0.
04
1*
0.
04
5*
0.
04
6*
* 
 
 
(1
.9
2)
(2
.0
1)
 
(2
.2
2)
(1
.7
6)
(1
.7
5)
(1
.9
0)
(2
.0
1)
 
Pa
yp
al
  
 
0.
02
7 
0.
02
8*
0.
03
2*
0.
03
3*
0.
03
5*
*
0.
03
2*
 
 
 
(1
.6
0)
 
(1
.6
9)
(1
.9
0)
(1
.9
0)
(2
.0
4)
(1
.8
8)
 
Le
ng
th
  
 
 
0.
00
5
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
4 
 
 
 
(1
.2
8)
(0
.8
2)
(0
.8
2)
(1
.1
2)
(1
.1
6)
 
G
al
le
ry
 
 
 
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
18
 
 
 
 
(-
1.
35
)
(-
1.
34
)
(-
1.
14
)
(-
0.
93
) 
B
ol
d 
 
 
0.
00
6
0.
00
3
-0
.0
01
 
 
 
 
(0
.2
2)
(0
.1
4)
(-
0.
03
) 
R
es
er
ve
 
 
 
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
23
 
 
 
 
(-
1.
34
)
(-
0.
99
) 
N
um
of
B
id
s 
 
 
0.
00
2*
* 
 
 
 
(2
.3
8)
 
C
on
st
an
t 
5.
65
1 
5.
65
9
5.
61
5
5.
60
9
5.
57
2
5.
54
2 
5.
51
8
5.
53
7
5.
53
7
5.
53
8
5.
48
8 
 
(3
61
.5
0)
 
(3
36
.7
9)
(2
79
.4
8)
(2
41
.2
6)
(1
87
.2
2)
(1
58
.4
1)
 
(1
38
.6
4)
(1
31
.2
1)
(1
30
.5
3)
(1
31
.0
5)
(1
18
.5
3)
 
R2
 
0.
10
9 
0.
15
3
0.
30
5
0.
30
7
0.
33
1
0.
34
6 
0.
35
7
0.
36
8
0.
36
8
0.
37
9
0.
41
3 
A
dj
. R
2 
0.
09
5 
0.
12
7
0.
27
3
0.
26
8
0.
28
6
0.
29
7 
0.
30
1
0.
30
7
0.
30
0
0.
30
6
0.
33
6 
